Orthodox Apologetics

Translated by Dr. Jeffrey Macdonald, 1998.

www.voskrese.info/spl/nisibtext.html

As seen from holytrinitymission.org  (The Christological Issue)

The Monophysites.

Although most of the Monophysites were ready to anathematize Eutyches as well as the idea that Christ’s humanity was "confused" with His divinity, they held steadfastly to the theology and terminology of Cyril of Alexandria. Just as the "old Nicaeans" in the fourth century had refused to accept the formula of the three hypostasis introduced by the Cappadocian Fathers because Athanasius had not used it, so the leaders of fifth- and sixth-century Monophysitism — Dioscoros of Alexandria, Philoxenus of Mabbugh, and the great Sever us of Antioch — rejected the Council of Chalcedon and the Christological formula of "one hypostasis in two natures" because Cyril had never used it and because they interpreted it as a return to Nestorianism. The danger of Eutychianism that they claimed was not serious enough to justify the Chalcedonian departure from Cyril’s terminology. They objected most violently — and this objection may be the real serious difference between their Christology and Chalcedonian orthodoxy — to the idea that the two natures after the union "retain in full their proper characteristics."

The Strict Dyophysites.

The strict Dyophysites were Chalcedonians, which still rigidly maintained the Antiochian Christology and objected to some of Cyril’s propositions such as the Theopaschite formula: "One of the Holy Trinity suffered in the flesh." For them, the subject of suffering is Jesus, the son of Mary, not the divine Logos. But, one may ask, is there not then a duality of subjects in Christ? The existence of this party in the Chalcedonian camp and the influence exercised by its representatives — Theodoret of Cyrus until his death around year 466, Gennadios of Constantinople (458-471), his successor Macedonios (495-511), and others — provided the Monophysites with their main arguments for rejecting Chalcedon as a Nestorian council and as a disavowal of Cyril.

The Cyrillian Chalcedonians.

The Cyrillian Chalcedonians, who were obviously the majority at the council itself, never admitted that there was a contradiction between Cyril and Chalcedon. Neither terminology was considered an end in itself but only the appropriate way of opposing Nestorianism and Eutychianism respectively. The position of the Cyrillian Chalcedonians as distinct from the strict Dyophysite position is symbolized by the acceptance of the Theopaschite Cyrillian formula. The representatives of this tendency — the "Scythian monk" John Maxentios, John the Grammarian, Ephraem of Antioch, Leontius of Jerusalem, Anastasius of Antioch, Eulogius of Alexandria, Theodore of Raithu — dominated Byzantine theology in the sixth century and won the support of Justinian I. Recent historians (Joseph Lebon and Charles Moeller among them) often designate this tendency as "neo-Chalcedonian," implying that the strict Dyophysite understanding of Chalcedon is the only correct one and that Antiochian Christology is preferable to Cyrillian. The implications of the debate on this point are very broad in both Christological and anthropological fields, for it questions the very notion of "deification."

The Origenists.

The Origenists involved in violent controversies but influential at the court in the beginning of Justinian’s reign offered their own solution based upon the quite heretical Christology of Evagrius Ponticus. For them, Jesus is not the Logos but an "intellect" not involved in the original Fall and thus united hypostatically and essentially with the Logos. The writings of Leontius of Byzantium, the chief representative of Origenist Christology in Constantinople, were included in the pro-Chalcedonian polemical arsenal however and his notion of the enhypostaton was adopted by Maximus the Confessor and John of Damascus, who, of course, rejected the crypto-Origenistic context in which it originally appeared.

The Fifth Ecumenical Council (553) convoked by Justinian in order to give formal ecclesiastical approval to his attempts at making Chalcedon acceptable to the Monophysites was a triumph of Cyrillian Chalcedonianism. It approved Justinian’s earlier posthumous condemnation of the Three Chapters, and, though Theodore was personally condemned as a heretic and the teacher of Nestorius, Ibas and Theodoret, whom the Council of Chalcedon had officially accepted as orthodox, were spared as persons; their writings directed against Cyril however fell under the anathemas of 553. Thus, the authority of Chalcedon was formally preserved, but the strict Dyophysite interpretation of its decisions was formally rejected. The council very strongly reaffirmed the unity of subject in Christ (anathemas 2, 3, 4, 5) and, hence, formally legitimized the Theopaschite formula (anathema 10). This formula was henceforth chanted at every liturgy in the hymn "The Only-Begotten Son of God," which has been attributed to Justinian himself. Though anathema 13 gave formal approval to the Twelve Chapters of Cyril against Nestorius, anathema 8 specified that if one should use the Cyrillian formula "one nature incarnated," the word "nature" would stand for hypostasis. Thus, in joining the Orthodox Church, the Monophysites were not required to reject anything of Cyrillian theology but only to admit that Chalcedon was not a Nestorian council.

Unfortunately, by 553, the schism was too deeply rooted in Egypt and Syria, and the conciliar decision had no practical effect. The decision represents however a necessary pre-condition for any future attempts at reunion and an interesting precedent of a reformulation of an article of faith and already defined by a council for the sake of "separated" brethren who misunderstand the previous formulation.

This is from the book "In the Shadow of the Temple: Jewish Influences on Early Christianity"
by Oskar Skarsaune

""Jewish scholars in antiquity, the Middle Ages and modern times have almost unanimously claimed that the idea that Jesus is the incarnate Word of God is un-Jewish, a product of Christianity's transplantation from a Jewish milieu to a Gentile-Hellenistic milieu. Liberal Christian scholars in modern times have said much the same thing, as for example, the great historian of dogma, Adolf von Harnack. His saying has become famous: "The Christological dogma.....is a product of the spirit of Hellenism on the soil of the Gospel."

Now, as Harnack was well aware, there is no way of holding the eastern creed to be basically Greek and un-Jewish, while at the same time holding John the Evangelist, or for that matter Paul, to be un-Greek and Jewish in their Christology. Therefore, according to many critical scholars, the process of "Hellenizing" Christianity must have begun very early, underway already in Paul, and seems to have reached a first climax in John 1:1-18 (the so-called Johannine Prologue).
In our time, the Jewish writer Pinchas Lapide has tried to understand this "Hellenization" in Christology as a conscious cultural adaptation. He says about Paul:

He brought the message of the Jewish Messiah to the pagan world with a commitment of complete faith.....He was successful in being a Greek for the Greeks and a Jew for the Jews. He possessed courage to display religious imagination. He knew that he would be rejected if he came either to Corinth or Rome and preached about an anointed Jewish Messiah who David's son. They would not understand what he was talking about. But for Greek and Roman ears, he would fare extremely well talking about an incarnate Son of God and a Logos, a divine Word who had descended in order to redeem the world. On the other hand, this made no sense to Galilean fishermen and shepherds. That was why Paul appeared in Jerusalem as a devout, faithful Jew proclaiming a Jewish Messiah, while for Greeks he spoke of a savior who was the Son of God.(7)

So this is the challenge we face in this chapter: Are Harnack, Lapide and a score of other experts correct in their evaluation of eastern Christology as utterly Hellenistic and un-Jewish?
Let us begin with an observation on the typical Hellenistic reaction to the dogma of the incarnate Son of God. Lapide would have us believe that this was something Gentile Hellenists would really appreciate, something they craved for, something they would embrace enthusiastically. But we have several authentic reports on the Gentile Hellenistic reaction, and it does not correspond to this picture at all. The available evidence shows, on the contrary, that most Hellenists reacted with disgust and contempt at the very idea of a divine incarnation, and with charges of blasphemy when they heard that the incarnate Son of God had suffered the uttermost shame of crucifixion. We will let one Gentile author speak for all. He is Celsus, a Platonist philosopher writing a polemic book against Christianity ca A.D. 175

God is good and beautiful and happy, and exists in the most beautiful state. If then he comes down to men, he must undergo change, a change from good to bad, from beautiful to shameful, from happiness to misfortune, and from what is best to what is most wicked. Who would choose a change like this? It is the nature only of a mortal being to undergo change and remolding, whereas it is the nature of an immortal being to remain the same without alteration. Accordingly, God could not be capable of undergoing this change..... Either God does change, as the Christians say, into a mortal body; and it has already been said that this is an impossibility. Or he does not change, but makes those who see him think that he does so, and leads them astray, and tells lies...Dear Jews and Christians, no God or child of God has either come down or would want to come down (from heaven)!

Tertullian once made a point of this difficulty, the offensiveness of the fact of the incarnation. It is as if he were striving to express the basic intuition that the offensiveness of the Christological dogma is precisely what makes it ring true. Nobody would have dreamt of inventing anything so offensive! Besides, Tertullian reminds us, Paul has warned us that in the gospel we meet the foolishness of God. But, he says to Marcion, if you eliminate the birth and the suffering of the divine Son from the gospel, there is no foolishness left.

Which is more unworthy of God, which is more likely to raise a blush of shame, that God should be borne, or that he should die? That he should bear the flesh, or the cross? be circumcised, or be crucified, be cradled or be coffined, be laidin a manger, or in a tomb?

The Son of God was crucified. I am not ashamed of it, because it seems shameful. And the Son of God dies, it is by all means to be believed, because it is absurd. And He was buried, and rose again; the fact is certain, precisely because it is impossible. (De carne Christi 5.1, 4) (9)

Thus, according to Tertullian, the very offensiveness of the Christological confession carries the conviction of its truth. This is not something we have made up.
So Celsus and Tertullian have made us aware of the true response to the concept of incarnation in the Hellenistic world. And that means that the Christian doctrine of the incarnation can hardly be the product of a milieu- the Hellenistic- that regarded this doctrine as a philosophical and theological monstrosity. Nor can it be the brilliant idea of someone trying to speak the way Hellenists liked." [1]

[1] pages 322-325 from the book In the Shadow of the Temple: Jewish Influences on Early Christianity by Oskar Skarsaune

A Cappadocian interpretation of the original Nicene Creed

The link:
http://archive.org/details/letterswithengli02basiuoft

Defence of the Nicene Definition

 
Defence Against the Arians


On the Incarnation of the Word

As seen from the Orthodoxchristianity forum:

Quote

Quote:
"According to His Eminence (whom I just spoke with):

We can say that Christ's Hypostasis is a Divine Hypostasis that took on Humanity, and Christ's Prosopon is a Divine Prosopon that took on Humanity.  We cannot say that it is a Theanthropic Prosopon or Hypostasis, implying change in the immutable; nor can we say that they are only Divine, denying the Incarnation; but each statement must remain intact, that the Prosopon is a Divine Prosopon that took on Humanity, and that the Hypostasis is a Divine Hypostasis that took on Humanity; in both cases what Was was not changed, but still fully took on Humanity."

To know which retired Metropolitan said this, you will have to visit the link.

There was a Christological debate back in his day (against the heretic Marcion and others). It was more of an external debate and not an internal one like some centuries(the 4th to 6th centuries) in the future. Because this was before the major Christological debates of later centuries we can see a few mistakes that Tertullian made. I can now see where Saint Leo probably got some of his ideas from. But yeah, Tertullian was a little loose in his language. Something that the feuds of later centuries would refine.

http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf03.v.vii.v.html 

 [As a side note: When Tertullian makes use of the term "NATURE", he means substance or Essence. I could be wrong, but I don't recall the Christian West having more than one meaning in regards to that term.]

quote:
"The Son of God was crucified; I am not ashamed because men must needs be ashamed of it. And the Son of God died; it is by all means to be believed, because it is absurd. And He was buried, and rose again; the fact is certain, because it is impossible. But how will all this be true in Him, if He was not Himself true—if He really had not in Himself that which might be crucified, might die, might be buried, and might rise again? I mean this flesh suffused with blood, built up with bones, interwoven with nerves, entwined with veins, a flesh which knew how to be born, and how to die, human without doubt, as born of a human being. It will therefore be mortal in Christ, because Christ is man and the Son of man.

Else why is Christ man and the Son of man, if he has nothing of man, and nothing from man? Unless it be either that man is anything else than flesh, or man’s flesh comes from any other source than man, or Mary is anything else than a human being, or Marcion’s man is as Marcion’s god. Otherwise Christ could not be described as being man without flesh, nor the Son of man without any human parent; just as He is not God without the Spirit of God, nor the Son of God without having God for His father. Thus the nature

of the two substances displayed Him as man and God,—in one respect born, in the other unborn; in one respect fleshly, in the other spiritual; in one sense weak, in the other exceeding strong; in one sense dying, in the other living. This property of the two states—the divine and the human—is distinctly asserted with equal truth of both natures alike, with the same belief both in respect of the Spirit. and of the flesh. The powers of the Spirit, proved Him to be God, His sufferings attested the flesh of man. If His powers were not without the Spirit in like manner, were not His sufferings without the flesh. If His flesh with its sufferings was fictitious, for the same reason was the Spirit false with all its powers. Wherefore halve Christ with a lie?

He was wholly the truth. Believe me, He chose 526rather to be born, than in any part to pretend—and that indeed to His own detriment—that He was bearing about a flesh hardened without bones, solid without muscles, bloody without blood, clothed without the tunic of skin, hungry without appetite, eating without teeth, speaking without a tongue, so that His word was a phantom to the ears through an imaginary voice. A phantom, too, it was of course after the resurrection, when, showing His hands and His feet for the disciples to examine, He said, “Behold and see that it is I myself, for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye see me have;” without doubt, hands, and feet, and bones are not what a spirit possesses, but only the flesh."

You can read the whole thing at the link, but this should be good enough.



http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf03.v.ix.xxvii.html

quote:
"Now what Divine Person was born in it? The Word, and the Spirit which became incarnate with the Word by the will of the Father. The Word, therefore, is incarnate; and this must be the point of our inquiry: How the Word became flesh,—whether it was by having been transfigured, as it were, in the flesh, or by having really clothed Himself in flesh. Certainly it was by a real clothing of Himself in flesh. For the rest, we must needs believe God to be unchangeable, and incapable of form, as being eternal. But transfiguration is the destruction of that which previously existed.

For whatsoever is transfigured into some other thing ceases to be that which it had been, and begins to be that which it previously was not. God, however, neither ceases to be what He was, nor can He be any other thing than what He is. The Word is God, and “the Word of the Lord remaineth for ever,”—even by holding on unchangeably in His own proper form. Now, if He admits not of being transfigured, it must follow that He be understood in this sense to have become flesh, when He comes to be in the flesh, and is manifested, and is seen, and is handled by means of the flesh; since all the other points likewise require to be thus understood. For if the Word became flesh by a transfiguration and change of substance, it follows at once that Jesus must be a substance compounded of two substances—of flesh and spirit,—a kind of mixture, like electrum, composed of gold and silver; and it begins to be neither gold (that is to say, spirit) nor silver (that is to say, flesh),—the one being changed by the other, and a third substance produced.

Jesus, therefore, cannot at this rate be God for He has ceased to be the Word, which was made flesh; nor can He be Man incarnate for He is not properly flesh, and it was flesh which the Word became. Being compounded, therefore, of both, He actually is neither; He is rather some third substance, very different from either. But the truth is, we find that He is expressly set forth as both God and Man; the very psalm which we have quoted intimating (of the flesh), that “God became Man in the midst of it, He therefore established it by the will of the Father,”—certainly in all respects as the Son of God and the Son of Man, being God and Man, differing no doubt according to each substance in its own especial property, inasmuch as the Word is nothing else but God, and the flesh nothing else but Man. Thus does the apostle also teach respecting His two substances, saying, “who was made of the seed of David;” in which words He will be Man and Son of Man. “Who was declared to be the Son of God, according to the Spirit;”

in which words He will be God, and the Word—the Son of God. We see plainly the twofold state, which is not confounded, but conjoined in One Person—Jesus, God and Man. Concerning Christ, indeed, I defer what I have to say. (I remark here), that the property of each nature is so wholly preserved, that the Spirit on the one hand did all things in Jesus suitable to Itself, such as miracles, and mighty deeds, and wonders; and the Flesh, on the other hand, exhibited the affections which belong to it. It was hungry under the devil’s temptation, thirsty with the Samaritan woman, wept over Lazarus, was troubled even unto death, and at last actually died. If, however, it was only a tertium quid, some composite essence formed out of the Two substances, like the electrum (which we have mentioned), there would be no distinct proofs apparent of either nature. But by a transfer of functions, the Spirit would have done things to be done by the Flesh, and the Flesh such as are effected by the Spirit; or else such things as are suited neither to the Flesh nor to the Spirit, but confusedly of some third character.

Nay more, on this supposition, either the Word underwent death, or the flesh did not die, if so be the Word was converted into flesh; because either the flesh was immortal, or the Word was mortal. Forasmuch, however, as the two substances acted distinctly, each in its own character, there necessarily accrued to them severally their own operations, and their own issues. Learn then, together with Nicodemus, that “that which is born in the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is Spirit.”

Neither the flesh becomes Spirit, nor the Spirit flesh. In one Person they no doubt are well able to be co-existent. Of them Jesus consists—Man, of the flesh; of the Spirit, God—and the angel designated Him as “the Son of God,”

in respect of that nature, in which He was Spirit, reserving for the flesh the appellation “Son of Man.” In like manner, again, the apostle calls Him “the Mediator between God and Men,” and so affirmed His participation of both substances. Now, to end the matter, will you, who interpret the Son of God to be flesh, be so good as to show us what the Son of Man is? Will He then, I want to know, be the Spirit? But you insist upon it that the Father Himself is the Spirit, on the ground that “God is a Spirit,” just as if we did not read also that there is “the Spirit of God;” in the same manner as we find that as “the Word was God,” so also there is “the Word of God.” ""

To read the whole thing please go to the link


Elsewhere in his works, we see Tertullian advocating that the Logos had assumed it's own human soul as well as it's own human flesh. This long before the 4th century with the feud with Apollinaris, and so some regions of the church did talk about Christology long before the 4th and 5th centuries.

But in the quote above we see that Tertullian rejected the idea of the mixing(the confusion or changing of, an example would be the mixing of two colors to create a brand new third color) of Natures(essences). The compound Nature that he was fighting against was one in where the natures were either mixed to create some sort of hybrid 3rd nature, which would neither be divine nor human, but something else completely.

He is not fighting against the later Cyrillian interpretation of a compound Nature(Person, concrete Identity, Hypostasis....etc)

But he(Tertullian) is fighting against what we Orthodox Christians would call an Eutychian interpretation of "compound Nature". However, his dyophysitism is un-developed and thus has a couple problems with it. But the core essence of what we would later see in Chalcedon is obviously present in Tertullian some centuries earlier.

                                       The answer is NO!

                         As seen from the book An Outline of Orthodox Patristic Dogmatics

Many modern theologians spoke about a Semi-Arianism of the first Church Fathers and authors. This, however, seems to be based on the fact that they did not understand their teaching and manner of thought. According to certain ancient theologians, we have the "spoken" and the "innate" Word (Logos). This distinction between these two senses of logos clearly indicates that in the perception of these more ancient theologians, there is a distinction between the natural and eternal existence of God and His Logos and their relation to the world and operation in it. Before the creation of the world out of nothing, God has had His innate logos eternally in Himself.

Through His creative operation (energy), God through the Logos produces created beings out of nothing, and for this purpose, the innate logos becomes spoken. So, to begin with, the Logos is potentially spoken, and afterwards, it becomes spoken actively. What, however, is particularly important is that, for the ancient authors, the innate Logos and the spoken Logos are not two hypostaseis, but one and the same being. The spoken and the innate Logos do not differ from each other. The same Logos becomes spoken having first been innate. On the contrary, Arius accepts an un-heard of doctrine of two Logoi and, as it appears, following Lucian, he adapts it to the views of Paul of Samosata.

page 19 from the book "An Outline of Orthodox Patristic Dogmatics" by Protopresbyter John Romanides, translated and edited by Protopresbyter George Dion. Dragas. 2004 Orthodox Theological Library

As seen from the book The Historic Church: An Orthodox View of Christian History

 Calvin’s Christology
Although Calvin claims to accept
Chalcedonian Christology, he so emphasizes the division between the human and divine natures of Christ that he falls into Nestorian-like beliefs. He shows definite Nestorian tendencies during his arguments against the Lutheran doctrine of the Eucharist. Calvin taught that the Faithful could not receive the actual body of Christ, because the human body of Christ, “is contained in heaven, where it was once received, and will remain until the judgment.”941

Thus, Calvin rejected the patristic doctrine of the “communication of attributes.” For this reason he did not teach the deification of the human nature of Christ through its union with the divine nature. The doctrine of the “communication of attributes,” and the deification of the human nature of Christ are both are essential elements of the Christology of the Fathers and the Ecumenical Councils.942 Rejection of these key doctrines, compromises the union between the human and divine natures of Christ and leads to a division between the two natures that is very close to the teachings of Nestorianism.

The defects in Calvin’s thought show the wisdom of the Fathers of the Fifth Council, Constantinople II in 553, which declared that Chalcedon must be understood in conformity with the teachings of St. Cyril of Alexandria. By denying the deification of the human nature of Christ, Calvin rejected the foundation of salvation which is the Incarnation and the deification of humanity through the deification of the human nature of Christ.

Although Calvin affirmed his belief in the Incarnation, it is clear that his teachings deprive the Incarnation of its real meaning because he denies the deification of the human nature of Christ.
For this reason, it is not surprising that some of Calvin’s heirs reject traditional Christology and teach that Jesus Christ was only an inspired man, an idea that is the essence of Nestorianism.[1] 

 [1], pages 290-291 by Archpriest John W. Morris (2011-07-15). The Historic Church: An Orthodox View of Christian History (290), (p. 291). AuthorHouse. Kindle Edition.

Why Did God Become Man? The Unconditionality of the Divine Incarnation by Panagiotes Nellas (†1986)

. quote:
 "4. The View of the Mystery of the Incarnation in Relation to
the Fall, and Its Significance.
Man’s temporal Fall, however, created two other impediments,
which in a tragically real way obstruct the outpouring of the Spirit and the full realization of salvation (or completion, recapitulation,
deification, or whatever we may call it). And these real impediments,
which exist within time, need to be dealt with in a way which is
equally real and temporal.

This is why the Son of Man comes
as a giant to run the course of our... nature and through
suffering to make His way to death, and to bind the strong
man and plunder his goods... and lead the erring sheep
back to the heavenly land,
as St. John of Damascus writes poetically.13
And, as the Divine Cabasilas says,
This is what happens, then. God makes His own the
struggle on behalf of men, for He is man. Man, being pure
from all sin, overcomes sin, for he is God (513B).

Thus we arrive at the postlapsarian, historical view of the mystery of the Divine Incarnation, and the postlapsarian application of
the passage of Cabasilas which we quoted at the beginning of the
theological section of our study.
We shall not concern ourselves in detail here with this postlapsarian view of the mystery of the Divine Incarnation—not because it does not bear on our subject, but for the sole reason that
space is limited.
For it is a truth just as fundamental as that previously stated that
man, broken, degraded, and enslaved to sin, the Devil, and death on
account of the Fall is in need of redemption. And he cannot achieve
redemption on his own. Man was obliged to “retrieve his defeat,”

Cabasilas says. But he was unable to win the battle.
Indeed, no human wisdom, strength, virtue, or righteousness
could overcome death, a boundary which, by historical standards, is
fundamental and decisive. On the other hand, God, Who could have destroyed sin, the
Devil, and death by a single thought did not do so, because that
would have been unjust; it was man, and not God, who had been
defeated, and man had to retrieve the situation.
It is at this point that Cabasilas sums up the second aspect of
the mystery of the Incarnation, that “God makes His own the struggle
on behalf of men, for He is man,” and its corollary: “Man, being pure
from all sin, overcomes sin, for he is God.”

Cabasilas dwells at length on this postlapsarian aspect of the
mystery, and in my book  Ἡ περὶ δικαιώσεως τοῦ ἀνθρώπου
διδασκαλία τοῦ Καβάσιλα [Cabasilas’ teaching on the justification of man] I expounded it in detail.
It would truly be a grave spiritual, pastoral, and also theological
error to ascribe a secondary importance to the reality of sin and the
need for redemption. From this standpoint, we would not have had
the right to treat the subject as we do here if we had not previously written an entire book on the Sin-Redemption dimension. Yet it
would be an equally grave error to limit salvation, that is, deification,
to redemption alone.

In the first case, Christianity would be transformed into an unrealistic mysticism; in the second, it would be degraded to a legalistic ethical system.
As a true theologian of the Catholic Church, Cabasilas took into
account both of these truths; and, in contrast to Anselm, who restricted Christianity and man to the Fall-Redemption polarity, he
gave this polarity the attention that it merits and, at the same time,
placed it in its proper context, at the same stroke giving man his
true scope.
After this crucially important observation, to which we ask the
reader to pay special attention, it is time to return to studying more
directly the problem that we posed at the outset, that of narrowing
the axis of the Divine Œconomy from Creation-Deification to FallRedemption.III. The Significance of Cabasil.

 

Quote:
"4. Overcoming the Fear of Sin as the Central Motive of Spiritual Life. Christ, the Beginning, Middle, and End of Spiritual
Life.
BUT Cabasilas’ correct answer to “Cur Deus homo?” also brings
the liberation of man from evil and sin. No matter how terrifying
evil may be, since it, and not Christ, is merely an episode and an
event, it proves, in the final analysis, insignificant. The understanding of man—of salvation, spiritual life, and so forth—is disjoined
from evil and joined to Christ.
Ascesis, charity, etc. are not the “good works” that will counterbalance our sins before God’s justice and in that way offer Him satisfaction.

God is not a “sadistic father” who takes satisfaction in torturing
his children. Ascesis is a vigorous struggle against evil. And man can
throw himself into this struggle much more easily, with hope and
joy, if his aim is to develop the seeds of godlikeness that he has within him, a longing for all the elements of his being to be united with
Christ, and not simply fear of sin.
The real sin, for Cabasilas, is for man to remain outside Christ,
to consider that he is sufficient on his own, i.e., autonomy. Adam’s
greatest sin, the sin that engendered all of the others, was that he
wanted to live with the life of his nature, to exist independently of
God. This led him to death.

Cabasilas is unambiguous on this point. If man is not alive with
the life of Christ, he is dead, even if he is a fine and good person socially or religiously, even if he formally observes the prescriptions
of the law. On the axis of  Fall-Redemption, justice and law are
dominant. On the axis of Creation-Deification, sin consists in making oneself autonomous, in self-sufficiency. And this, according to
the ascetic Fathers, was the greatest danger lurking even for the redeemed. The dominant figure on this axis is Christ.
Therefore, the ethos of Orthodox believers is not legalistic, but
theocentric. Any virtue in man has value to the extent that it is a
virtue of Christ, says Cabasilas. For only what is incorporated in
Christ and, consequently, spiritual (“born from above”) is able to sur-mount the biological boundaries of corruption and death. “In this
way the Saints are blessed, because of the blessed One Who is with them”
(613A).
The holiness of the saints is due to the fact that they have united
their will to the will of Christ. The wisdom of the truly wise, those
who uncover the truth by Divine inspiration, is due to their having
united their mind with the mind of Christ. “From themselves and
from human nature and effort there is nothing whatever... Rather, they
are holy because of the Holy One, righteous and wise because of the righteous and wise One Who abides with them” (613A).

For this reason, Cabasilas advises, “be merciful” not in a human
way “but as your Father is merciful.”
The faithful are called to love “in the love with which Paul ‘yearned
with the affection of Jesus Christ’” (Philippians 1:8), and to have the
love “with which the Son loved the Father,” and the peace that is not
human, but of Christ. For, as the birth is “Divine and preternatural,”
so also “the new life, its regime and philosophy, and all these things are
new and spiritual” (616A).

This Pauline Christocentricity which places Christ as the beginning, middle, and end of the world and of history is the core of Cabasilas’ work. This is the basis on which he gave a correct answer to
the question, “Cur Deus homo?,” confined the  Fall-Redemption
axis to its proper bounds and revealed the true breadth of the Divine Œconomy, which begins from Creation and reaches to Deification, that extension without end of created man within the uncreated God.
As has become evident from the few examples that we have been
able to give within the scope of this study, Cabasilas placed on this
axis all the realities of faith, spiritual life, and the Church, and revealed their true nature and their extraordinary transformative dynamism."

In regards to Christology, what stood out to me was a number of things. Some of which were:


201. Pyrrus: But the Fathers said this on the level of Theology and not on the level of Economy.113 Hence, no one who loveth the truth should change the appointed meaning of their statements which refer to Theology into statements that refer to the Economy, and therby introduce an absurdity.114


202. Maximus: If the Fathers say it of the Theology alone, then after the Incarnation it is not possible--so thou wouldst have us say -- to regard the Son as equally divine as the Father. And if it be not possible to regard Him as equally divine, then He hath no place in the invocation [of the Divine Name] at baptism. So both faith and preaching shall, in the last analysis, to be proven to be in vain.

203.   And again, if it be not possible to regard the Son as equally divine with the Father after the Incarnation, then [how will these statements be explained]? "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work."115 Or "Whatever the Son seeth the Father doing, the Son doeth likewise"?116 Or "If ye believe not me, believe my works"?117
Or "The works which I do bear witness of me"?118 Or "For as the Father raiseth up the dead and quickeneth them, even so the Son quickeneth whom He will"?119 For all these prove that He was not only of the same essence as the Father after the Incarnation, but of the same energy as well.

204. And again, if the foreknowledge of beings be a divine energy, and if it be not only proper to the Father and the Spirit, but further, be also proper to the Son even after the Incarnation, then the Son is of the same energy after the Incarnation as the Father.

205. And again, if the miracles be a divine operation, and if we know from the miracles that He is of the same essence as the Father, then from the same energy He is shown to be of the same essence as the Father, and is to be regarded as equally divine [with Him] after the Incarnation [as He was before it].

206. And again, if the creative energy be an attribute proper to the essence of God, then the attributes of the essence are by necessity inseparable. S those who say that after then Incarnation He is not of the same energy as the Father also say that He is not of the same essence, for where the energy proper to a given nature is not found neither shall that nature be found. Conversely, those who say that He is of the same essence say that He is of the same energy as well, and regard Him to be equally divine [with the Father] after the Incarnation [as He was before it]. For wherever the natures is, there also is the energy proper to it, without diminution.

207. Pyrrhus: But we do not say "one energy" as a denial of human operation. It is said to be passable by opposition to the divine nature.120

208. Maximus: Then by the same principle those who say one nature do not say this as a denial of the humanity, but by this means oppose its passable character to the divine nature.

209. Pyrrhus: So? Did not the fathers define passibility by means of its difference from the divine operation [of impassibility]?

210. Maximus: God forbid! For no [father], ever defined an existence by comparison to its opposite or found the one to be the cause of the other. For if human passion is caused in such a manner by the divine energy, then doubtless human imperfection existeth because of the goodness of the divine nature. And the exact opposite may also then be stated: that through the passable human motion the divine energy existeth, and that because the human nature is evil, the divine nature is good. But enough of this! For such[conceptions are quite perverse.121


211. Pyrrhus: Why? Did the Fathers not designate passion as the human motion?


212. Maximus: Yes, but the spoke in various ways about these same propositions and conceptions.


213. Pyrrhus: How canst thou say this?


214. Maximus: They referred to the same thing as power, energy, distinctions, motion, property, quality, and passion, but not by opposition to the divine [energy]. Power they defined as that which maintaineth immutability, energy as that which characterizeth the same forms by indistinquishable productions, distinction as that which defineth a thing, motion as that which manifesteth, property as a component attributed only to one thing and not to another, quality as that which imparteth form, and passion as that which is moved. For all things that are from God and after God change by motion, for they are not self-moved beings of omnipotent power.122 Therefore, they cannot be defined by opposition, but only by means of the rational principle created and placed into them, which are the established causes in each thing.123
So[the human] energy is designated at the same time as the divine, for what else can one make of the expression "He operateth in the form of each of the two by the communion of each of the two"? Or "after He continued also for forty days fasting, He hungered, for He granted to nature when He so willed to enact those things proper to it?" Or of those who say either that there is a distinction of energy, or of those who say there are two energies, one, and another one?

___________________________________________________________

113  This would seem to explain why Pyrrhus persists in the literary spirit of St. Cyril of Alexandria, using physis  in Theology and Economy differently, whereas St. Maximus, firmly within the Cyrillic Chalcedonian tradition, uses a consistent terminology, where the meanings of hypostasis and nature remain the same, whether referring to Triadology(i.e., Theology) or Christology(i.e., Economy).


114 Pyrrhus seems to object to the whole enterprise of Cyrillic Chalcedonianism itself, and to its (eventually successful) effort to use technical terms such as hypostasis and nature univocally in both Theology and Economy.


120 Pyrrhus' argument is dependent upon the Neoplatonic and Plotinian paradigm, which would define all distinctions by means of a dialectical opposition. cf. EnneadsIII:2:16,17:

"The All is in accordance with its rational formative pattern, and it is necessary that this one formative pattern should be one pattern made out of opposites, since it is opposition of this kind which gives it its structure, and, we might say, its existence..........distinction is opposition......the more it is differentiated the more opposed will it make the things it makes."(trans. A.H. Armstrong, Loeb Classical Library, No. 442, p.99)

121 Once again, St. Maximus' response is upon the implication of Pyrrhus' Neoplatonic dialectic which underwrites Monotheletism.


122 That is, created beings are self-moved, but not in the manner of God, with complete omnipotence, independence, and autonomy. In this sense, they are not "autonomous", which would be dualism, nor merely passive automatons in the face of an irresistible divine energy, which would be fatalism, nor are they mere emanations of the divine essence, which would be pantheism. rather, they are "semi-autonomous", i.e., precisely created, and therefore a uniquely different kind of being, with a different kind of free choice and activity, which nevertheless depended at all times on the divine will for their existence and activity.

123 That is, the nature of created beings is not defined by dialectical oppositions between them or between God, but by the distinguishing logoi in them.




pages 68 - 72 from the book The Disputation with Pyrrhus of our Father Among The Saints Maximus The Confessor. Translated from the greek by Joseph P. Farrel

The Disputation With Pyrrhus of Our Father Among the Saints Maximus the Confessor



7. Maximus: Yes, I truly do. For what is a more irreverent conception than that which maintains that the same person with the very same will, which before the Incarnation created everything from nothing and which maintains, provides, and orders everything for salvation, after the Incarnation desireth food and drink, changeth from one position to another, and performeth all manner of similar things that are free from blame and reproach, but which would by this means prove that the whole Economy of the Incarnation was not illusory?

8. Pyrrhus: But is Christ one or not?


9. Maximus: Yes, obviously He is one.


10. Pyrrhus: If Christ be one person, then He willed as one person. And if He willed as one person, then doubtless He hath one will, and not two.


11. Maximus: To state something and not first to distinquish the different meanings of what is being said invites confusion, and ensures that what is under investigation remains obscure, which is foreign to a man of learning. Therefore, explain this to me: If Christ be one, is He God only, or man only, or both together, God and man?

12. Pyrrhus: Obviously, God and man.


13. Maximus: Therefore, Christ existeth as God and as man by nature. Then did He will as God and as man, or only as Christ? If it were Christ who willed and initiated actions, being both God and man, then it is clear that, being one and the same, He willed dually and not singly. For if Christ be nothing else apart from the natures from which and in which He existeth, then obviously He willeth and operateth in a manner corresponding to each of his natures, in other words, as each nature is capable of operating. And if He hath two natures, then He surely must have two natural wills, the wills and essential operations being equal in number to the natures. For just as the number of natures of the one and the same Christ, correctly understood and explained, doth not divide Christ but rather preserveth the distinction of natures in the union, so likewise the number of essential attributes, wills, and operations attached to those two natures doth not divide Christ either. For throughout both of His natures there flowed the same activity and purpose, to witm our salvation. This introduceth no division -- God forbid! --but rather shows that they are preserved unimpaired, in their entirety, even in the union.


pages 3-5 from the book "The Disputation With Pyrrhus Of Our Father Among The Saints Maximus The Confessor" Translated from the Greek by Joseph P. Farrell

The Disputation With Pyrrhus of Our Father Among the Saints Maximus the Confessor

As with St. Irenaeus, there is an ecclesiological and sacramental dimension to the doctrine of Recapitulation. Baptism is an essential component of the mystery and for the spiritual life, since the believer must recapitulate that which Christ Himself fulfilled and repeated in His own Recapitulation. As was the case with Sts. Irenaeus and Athanasius, one cannot separate the divine and invisible nature from the works which He does in His human and visible nature, and therefore one cannot separate water and the Spirit into two separate baptisms or events, as this would be a kind of sacramental Nestorianism. [1]

[1] pages xii - xvi from the preface of the book The disputation with Pyrrhus of Our Father Among the Saints Maximus the Confessor

Translated by Kenneth P. Wesche

On the Person of Christ: The Christology of Emperor Justinian
From the preface:

"The documents of Justinian included in this volume represents a Cyrillian interpretation of the Christology of the Council of Chalcedon upheld by Orthodox theologians even today. For that reason these documents are important as a source for understanding the philosophical principles of Orthodox theology, particularly as Orthodox and other christian theologians come together in ecumenical dialogue. The principles of Orthodox philosophy find their starting point in the confession of Jesus as the Christ, the Son of God, the Divine Logos himself. The consequences of this confession of faith as a philosophical starting point are presented in brief both in the General Introduction and in the notes scattered throughout the text. Sixth century thought presents the student of christian doctrine with a dogmatic philosophy still in the process of attaining full clarification. The principal contribution made by sixth century thought towards a fully articulated "Christological philosophy" is the clear, unambiguous affirmation that the hypostasis or prosopon used in Chalcedon's definition of faith is not the product, but the foundation of the union between God and man in Jesus Christ: this is because the hypostasis of Jesus Christ is none other than the eternally existing Divine Logos, the Second Hypostasis of the Holy Trinity. These documents, therefore, are also of historical interest for they provide us with a glimps of christian philosophical thought moving closer to a full articulation of its belief in Jesus Christ." [1]

From the General Intoduction

Quote: “Nestorius was vigorously opposed by Cyril of Alexandria who insisted that the one who was born of Mary, Jesus of Nazareth, was none other than the Divine Logos himself. For that reason, Mary must be called “Theotokos” for Jesus whom she bore is himself God by nature and by hypostasis. This is the same as Justinian’s view and provides the background for understanding his freguent charges that the Nestorians call Christ a mere man. In fact, Nestorian Christology can indeed call Christ Christ God and man, but this is because “Christ” is the meeting point of the human and divine natures, and if we look at Christ in one direction we see the Divine Logos, or the divine nature, and if we look in another direction we see Jesus, or the human nature. The crucial point, however, is that in the Nestorian way of thinking, Jesus is the human nature in Christ and is therefore not himself identical to the Divine Logos. This latter point is what Justinian has in mind when he makes his charge, for with St. Cyril he wishes to emphasize that Jesus is not someone else than the Divine Logos but that he is one and the same Divine Logos; “Christ,” in other words, is the Divine Logos only who as the incarnate Divine Logos is both human and divine in nature, but divine only in identity or person.” [2]

quote: “It is most important to note how this view of Christ’s particularity distinquishes Justinian’s “Cyrillian Chalcedonianism from Nestorianism and from many Christologies one encounters in Western Christian thought. At issue is “who” lies inside the particular prosopon of Christ, and what is the starting point for determining that. Both Nestorianism and Cyrillian Chalcedonianism acknowledge that there is one Christ who is one particular or hypostasis or prosopon, and that furthermore this one Christ is divine and human in his natures. Many contemporary theologians who have sought to vindicate Nestorius from his condemnation at the Council of Ephesus in 431 base their defense of Nestorius precisely on this point: Nestorius, as also the Council of Chalcedon in 451, taught that Christ is one particular who is both God and man. But many of these scholars fail to grasp the significance of the fundamentally different starting points characterizing these two Christologies which lead to radically different notions of hypostasis and the content and identity of Christ.” [3]

Quote: “These different starting points yield radically different confessions concerning the philosophical content of the particular or hypostasis of Christ: the former understands hypostasis in terms of identity, i.e the subjective core, the “self” (autos in Greek) or “who” of Christ, which is one, and is seen to be the Divine Logos himself so that the terms “Jesus,” “Christ,” and “Divine Logos” are identical, referring to one and the same subject. The hypostasis, then, is the foundation, not the product, of the union, for it is the eternally existing Divine Logos, the one through whom all things came into being in the first place. The latter, on the other hand, starting from the “undivided appearence” of the historical Jesus, understands hypostasis as the product rather than the foundation of the coming together of the two natures. These two natures, moreover, are each seen as two fully intact subjects: Jesus is the human nature and so is a “someone other” than the Divine Logos, for the Divine Logos is the divine nature. On the basis of this Cyrillian Christology Justinian published the condemnation of the Three Chapters in 543, which was confirmed by the Fifth Ecumenical Council in Constantinople in 553. The Three chapters were “Nestorian” documents from the late fourth and fifth centuries. They included the writings of Theodore of Mopsuestia (and Theodore himself was included in the condemnation, which proved to be so controversial that Justinian was compelled to justify posthumous condemnations, which he does in the second and third documents presented here):” [4]

> [1] page 9,[2] pages 16-17,[3] page 17,[4] pages 18-19 from the book "On the Person of Christ: The Christology of Emperor Justinian" as translated by Kenneth P. Wesche

Christology Workshop by Dr. Jeffrey Macdonald




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...because no one can better express the Trinitarian view of the fourth century Eastern Orthodox Nicene and Cappadocian Fathers than a 21^st century Western tongue-talking Charismatic-Pentecostal!

The one in the middle is the Father of the Universe, who in the Sacred Scriptures is called by his proper name, I am that I am ; and the Beings on each side are those most ancient Powers which are always close to the living God, one of which is called his Creative Power, and the other his Royal Power. And the Creative Power is God, for it is by this that he made and arranged the Universe; and the Royal Power is the Lord, for it is fitting that the Creator should lord it over and govern the creature.

On one hand, we loved Christ so much that we began worshipping Him as a God ¹; on the other hand, we make up all these fancifully-imaginary stories about Him partaking of a shameful and painful death, by crucifixion, being abused, beaten, cursed, flogged, hurt, insulted, laughed at, mocked, punched, ridiculed, scorned, scourged, slapped, smitten, spat upon, tortured, and finally exposed naked on the rough wood of a Cross, for anyone to look upon Him with disgust, and consider Him as accursed by God Himself! ²


On one hand, Islam denies Christ's divinity; on the other hand, its teaching about the Crucifixion being an illusion was adopted from Docetism, an early Gnostic sect, whose Christology is diametrically-opposed to that of Muslims, considering Jesus to have been solely-divine, possessing only a spiritual body -- and since disincarnate beings like gods, ghosts, and spirits can't die...


¹ itself a question-begging double-standard, since early Christians abhorred the idea of deifying men, no matter how holy or high-up they were -- so why make an exception for Christ?
² Deuteronomy 21:23; Galatians 3:13.